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Abstract
It was expected that the increasing coverage of EU affairs in national public spheres would lead to a greater sense of
European belonging. The Internet was expected to foster this process. However, these expectations do not square with
the current political climate of identity politics and the revitalisation of nationalism. How can this incongruence between
theory and reality be understood? An intervening variable has added an unpredictability to the mix: information disorder.
It is our view that this theory needs revising to include other intervening variables such as social media and information
disorder. In this article, we argue that the current dynamic of Europeanised political communication is likely to compro-
mise the civic and vertical components of EU-identity.
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1. Introduction
Most scholars agree that ‘European identity’ and the
‘Europeanised public sphere’ exist in some shape or form
(e.g., Risse, 2010). Studies have shown that EU affairs
are becomingmore salient in the national public spheres
that comprise Europe (Eder & Kantner, 2000; Kriesi &
Grande, 2012; Risse, 2010). These concepts share three
things in common: their definitions are hotly contested;
they are understood to be socially constructed; and
they are being increasingly co-opted by European stud-
ies scholars (e.g., Machill, Beiler, & Fischer, 2006). This
is unsurprising given the growing consensus of ‘post-
functionalism’ which posits that further integration is
contingent on the general publics’ receptiveness to other
levels of attachment. However, post-functionalists ig-
nore an elephant in the room: themass media (deWilde,
2019). The latter is, after all, the linchpin connect-
ing political actors to civil society. Nonetheless, post-
functionalists—and their derivatives—widely agree that
‘feeling’ a sense of belonging to Europe is axiomatic
to the prospects of ‘ever closer union.’ In recent years,
‘politicisation’ has entered the academic fold for its nor-
mative potential to popularise European affairs and fos-
ter transnational communication. Some scholars even
claim that the increasingly transnational setting of pub-
lic spheres and politicisation can foster a European iden-
tity (e.g., Eilders & Lichtenstein, 2010). Our article criti-
cally evaluates the latter claim which belies the complex-
ities of an increasingly chaotic social world.We therefore
urge scholars to consider the phenomenon of online ‘in-
formation disorder’ on socialmedia, whichwe argue, has
a destabilising effect on the transnational public spheres’
functioning and ergo post-national identity formation.
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2. The Concept of European Identity and the European
Public Sphere
2.1. European Identity
In its broadest sense, European identitymeans a sense of
attachment to Europewhich is understood either as a cul-
tural, geographical, and/or political entity. This is an un-
controversial definition, but it still tells us little about the
concept’s intensionality. As with most concepts, things
get complex as one descends the ladder of abstraction.
European identity is a widely contested and elusive con-
cept, and endeavouring to define it in a few lines would
belie its complexity. We therefore focus on the concepts
common-denominator dimensions. Bruter’s (2003) dis-
tinction between civic and cultural components is an
instructive starting point. The former is understood as
“the degree to which they see themselves as citizens
of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and
rights have an influence on their daily life” (Thomassen,
2009, p. 188). The latter “may be defined as an individ-
ual citizen’s identification with a particular social group”
(MacMillan, 2013, p. 59). Cultural identity can be con-
structed inclusively in terms of universal or cosmopoli-
tan values, or exclusively through (sub-)nationalistic or
‘Fortress Europe’-type frames. Generally speaking, cul-
tural identity is more prone to exclusivity as culture is ha-
bitually understood as an autochthonous set of norms,
behaviours, and practices. On the contrary, civic identity
is generally more receptive to ‘outsiders’ as the latter
can adopt the laws and institutions of the host identity.
Moreover, citizenship can, in theory, be legally amended
to accommodate ‘outsiders’ and culturally heterogenous
groups. EU citizenship is a paradigmatic example of the
latter. In light of studies from social psychology, individu-
als tend to identify both with their nation, first and fore-
most, and the EU, secondly, when the latter’s civic or
cultural identity is congruent with their national identity.
Conversely, when the EU and the nation are constructed
incompatibly in respect of laws, institutions, goals and
values, exclusive identities become more likely (Wenzel,
Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007).
In order to delimit the scope of our argument, we
distinguish between vertical and horizontal identity: the
former consists of dually identifying with one’s nation
and the EU, whereas the latter consists in identifying
both with one’s nation and other European countries
or Europe as a whole. However, these horizontal and
vertical identities are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
politicians and the mass media generally use the terms
‘EU’ and ‘Europe’ interchangeably. Pro-Europeans tend
to equate EU-scepticism with the lack of identification
with Europe; however, it is logically conceivable to hold
anti-EU sentiments and still ‘feel’ European in the hor-
izontal sense. We argue that the current dynamic of
Europeanised political communication is likely to com-
promise the civic and vertical components of EU-identity.
A caveat is in order: Civic and cultural identity are notmu-
tually exclusive and may overlap. Indeed, we even coun-
tenance the possibility of national cultural-identitarian
frames adversely affecting civic attachment to the EU
whilst leaving ‘Fortress European’ identity intact. The
bottom line is identity is a multifaceted and complex
phenomenon, particularly when levels of attachment
beyond the nation state are considered. We therefore
delimit our argument to the civic dimension as previ-
ous studies (see Bruter, 2003) have demonstrated that
EU news predominantly affects the civic components of
identity, and EU news coverage largelymanifests as a ver-
tical constellation of national actors addressing EU-level
actors (Koopmans & Statham, 2010).
2.2. European Public Sphere
As with identity, the Europeanised public sphere is a
conceptual black box. Trenz (2008b, p. 278) broadly
defines the Europeanised public sphere as a “process
that enlarges the scope of public discourse beyond
the territorial nation state.” Although scholars disagree
on its normative dimensions, most scholars agree on
what Europeanised public sphere’s look like. A panoply
of different adjectives have been iterated to describe
the public sphere: ‘fragmented,’ ‘anarchic,’ ‘differenti-
ated’ (E. O. Eriksen, 2007), ‘heterogenous,’ ‘agonistic’
(Mouffe, 2007), ‘pluralistic’ (Sicakkan, 2012), ‘polymor-
phic,’ ‘polyphonic’ (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007), and
so on. The common denominator of these superlatives
are the public spheres’ lack of uniformity and unitarity.
It is widely accepted that all public spheres have his-
torically fallen short of their normative ideals. For ex-
ample, when judged against the normative benchmark
of inclusiveness and accessibility, we can confidently as-
sert that the 18th century ‘bourgeois public sphere’ (the
‘bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit’ in German) never existed, as
women and the working class were largely disenfran-
chised from participating in public debates. However,
many concepts exist along a continuum from minimum
to ideal-type requirements. ‘Europeanisation,’ ‘democ-
racy,’ and ‘public sphere’ are three apposite examples.
Our argument is thus predicated on an empirical under-
standing of the deliberative public sphere model. Based
on the findings from psychological and media studies
on information consumption and processing, we coun-
tenance an agonistic and irrational model of the public
sphere. An ideal public sphere presupposes respectful
debate thereby leading to rational assessment and the
internalisation of information. However, this does not
necessarily materialise in actual discourse, particularly
regarding the framing of European identity. Moreover,
recent studies—examining how humans process and in-
ternalise information—reveal an individual’s proclivity to
modify newly acquired information in order to reinforce
pre-existing beliefs (Southwell, Thorson, & Sheble, 2017).
However, we acknowledge that a normative checklist is
necessary prior to establishing if the phenomenon in
question exists. We therefore turn our attention to the
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minimum normative requirements of the Europeanised
public sphere.
A Europeanised public sphere should contain the
‘same issues’ (what Medrano, 2003, calls ‘thematische
Synchronizität’) at the ‘same time’ (Eder & Kantner,
2000) and employ ‘similar aspects of relevance’ (Adam,
2012; Eder & Kantner, 2000; E. O. Eriksen, 2007; Lindner,
Korthagen, & Aichholzer, 2018), that is, “with similar
frames of interpretation but not necessarily with the
same opinions” (Kantner, 2015, p. 87). However, these
conditions are not sufficient in themselves, as the ‘par-
allelisation’ of national debates can still suffice without
the spherical levels ‘interacting’ or ‘overlapping’ with
one another (Nitoiu, 2013;Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann,
Kleinen-von Königslöw, & Sifft, 2008). The Eder–Kantner
formulation lacks the dimension of ‘communicative link-
ages’ between speakers across different spherical lev-
els (Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Pfetsch, 2004). This
has led some scholars to insist on “discursive inter-
change” (Adam, 2012) or “increasing mutual intercon-
nections between national public spheres” (Brantner,
Dietrich, & Saurwein, 2005, p. 8). Europeanisation is
understood as a bi-directional process which implies a
continuum from minimum (i.e., visibility of EU actors
and interconnectivity) to optimal conditions (i.e., refer-
ences to a common identity, the same frames of ref-
erences, rational debate, etc.). At a minimum, the first
three conditions should be satisfied to be able to talk
meaningfully of a Europeanised public sphere. The last
requirement, however, distinguishes ‘Europeanised na-
tional public spheres’ from ‘nationalised public spheres’
reporting European issues more frequently.
With the above inmind, a logical next step is to estab-
lish whether a Europeanised public sphere exists in some
shape or form. In regard to the first two requirements
(see above), several studies have detected ‘thematis-
che Synchronizität’ across national public spheres (Eder
& Kantner, 2000; Kriesi & Grande, 2014; Risse, 2010;
Trenz, 2008b). Concerning the third requirement, it has
been consistently demonstrated that—as far as newspa-
pers (Bossetta & Segesten, 2019; Koopmans & Pfetsch,
2003; Pfetsch, 2004), television (Brantner et al., 2005;
Grill & Boomgaarden, 2017) and social media (Hänska
& Bauchowitz, 2019) are concerned—national public
spheres are embeddedwithin a larger European network
of communication. It is less clear whether the fourth
condition has been satisfied although most studies con-
clude that there are converging ‘structures of meaning’
across national media arenas (Bärenreuter, Brüll, Mokre,
& Wahl-Jorgensen, 2009; Bossetta & Segesten, 2019;
Eder & Kantner, 2000; Kantner, 2016; Risse, 2010, 2014).
The most notable critics of this view are Medrano and
Gray (2010) and Statham (2007) who found discernible
cross-national differences in how the EU is represented.
We can tentatively conclude, in light of a review of the
literature, that a thin veneer of Europeanisation exists,
notwithstanding the fact that national public spheres
are still heavily embedded in national communicative
structures. We therefore doubt the suppositions of de-
liberative scholars who claim that the current setting of
Europeanised public spheres are conducive to forging a
European identity.
3. The Public Sphere and Identity in the Digital Age:
Theoretical Background
One thing most scholars can agree on is public spheres
affect identities in some shape or form. Social con-
structivism is currently the dominant paradigm on ap-
proaches to identity (E. O. Eriksen, 2007; Heller & Rényi,
2008; MacMillan, 2013). Communication scholars have
underlined different aspects of communication as cru-
cial to the congealment of identity, such as: ‘discourse’
(Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Wodak, 2007); ‘narratives’ (Eder,
2009; Loseke, 2007; Scalise, 2013), and ‘deliberation’
(Dewey, 1927; Risse, 2014). Scholars such as Derrida em-
phasise the performative and enacting quality of dis-
courses (Derrida, 1988). In a similar vein, Delanty posits
that social identity is sustained by what he calls ‘dia-
logic identity’ (Delanty, 2005). Despite their subtle nu-
ances,most constructivists agree that identity is (re-) pro-
duced through media communication. The media are
not mere purveyors of the news; they determine what
is reported (i.e., ‘gate-keeping’) and how it is reported
(i.e., ‘agenda-setting’) through a panoply of framing de-
vices such as ‘valence,’ ‘sentiment,’ and ‘issue-framing’
(de Vreese & Kandyla, 2009; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006;
Van Cauwenberghe, Gelders, & Joris, 2009). The me-
dia largely determine what kinds of narratives (Eder,
2009), deictic constellations, and symbols dominate the
public sphere (Billig, 1995). Furthermore, editorials ren-
der the media as political entrepreneurs in their own
right (Voltmer & Eilders, 2003). The role of the me-
dia is even more decisive in a European context as
most people can only obtain information about Europe
through them. As Risse pithily remarks, “the [European]
public sphere is what the media make of it” (Risse,
2010, p. 115).
With social constructivism firmly in the driving seat,
scholars have shifted their attention towards the pub-
lic sphere which is regarded as the locus of national
identity formation (de Wilde & Trenz, 2012; Kleinen-von
Königslöw, 2010; Sicakkan, 2012). There is a rich body of
scholarship that underlines the co-constitutiveness of na-
tional identity and the public sphere. Bauer (1881–1938)
was probably one of the first scholars to establish the
link between communication and national identity. He
argued that the nation was a “community of fate” (“eine
Schicksalsgemeinschaft” in German) engaged in “general
reciprocal interaction” (Bauer, 2000, as cited in Fossum
& Schlesinger, 2007, p. 70). Similarly, Deutsch posited
the theory that national consciousness emerged through
strongly bounded patterns of social interaction: “People
are held together ‘from within’ by this communicative
efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative
facilities acquired by their members” (Deutsch, 1966,
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as cited in Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007, p. 70). Public
spheres were crucial to the construction of a nationally
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) through “tech-
nically reproduced print languages [that] have unified
fields of linguistic exchange, fixed national languages and
created idiolects of power” (Anderson, 1983, as cited
in Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007, pp. 70–71). Habermas
originally conceived of the ‘Öffentlichkeit’ as a figurative
space located within national boundaries (Habermas,
1991). For him, the public sphere went hand in glove
with the rise of the nation state. According to Billig’s
theory of ‘banal nationalism,’ nationhood is frequently
flagged through the reproduction of national symbols
and re-iteration of deixis (i.e., words such as ‘our,’ ‘we,’
‘here,’ ‘this,’ ‘the nation’) that “continually point to the
national homeland as the home of the readers” (Billig,
1995, p. 11). Other scholars have underlined the impor-
tance of the mass media in crystallising a national con-
sciousness (Cohen, 1994; Gellner, 2006).
However, scholars agree less on whether European-
ised political communication can help forge a European
identity. Nonetheless, there are several proponents of
this theory (Hennen et al., 2020; Pfetsch, 2005; van Os,
2005; Wodak, 2007). For instance, Eder (2009) argues
that European identity emerges through the sharing of
European narratives. Risse posits that European iden-
tity emerges out of contestation in the Europeanised
public sphere: “Debating European issues as European
questions…is likely to increase political identification lev-
els with the EU” (Risse, 2014, p. 156). Even the face of
neofunctionalism, Haas (1958), envisaged the “shifting
of loyalties, expectations and political activities toward
a new centre” (i.e., European identity) through sociali-
sation processes in which economic and political inter-
ests would converge (Haas, 1958, p. 16). Other schol-
ars underline the importance of ‘mediatised discourse’
for the congealment of European identity and empiri-
cal evidence is aplenty (Olausson, 2010; Scalise, 2013;
Triga & Vadratsikas, 2018; Valentini, 2006). For exam-
ple, Koopmans and Pfetsch (2003, p. 30) conclude that
German quality newspapers “emphasise the collective
identities, norms and values that Europe should stand
for.” Trenz carried out a study into framing concluding
that journalists tend to see Europe through a European
pair of glasses (Trenz, 2008a). Van Os (2005) identified a
general feeling of belonging to Europe among French po-
litical parties. Similarly, Van Cauwenberghe et al. (2009)
detected thematic synchronicity in EU news coverage
across national public spheres. However, one should
bear in mind that there is a notable selectivity-bias in
the newspapers chosen with tabloids largely neglected
from analysis.
Where does the Internet fit into the debate? Before
the turn of the millennium, most scholars assumed that
the Internet would herald an era of global governance,
universal cosmopolitanism, and the rise of post-national
identities. McLuhan’s (1964) cliché of the ‘global vil-
lage’ was the academic watchword, and scholars were
optimistic about public spheres’ identity-making func-
tion. This position is intuitively appealing: In theory, cy-
berspace is a boundless, de-territorialised infrastructure
of communication, and the Internet has dramatically re-
duced transaction costs of cross-border communication.
And, research on social movements has demonstrated
the capacity of the Internet to foster transnational iden-
tities (Della Porta & Mosca, 2006). Nonetheless, these
expectations do not square with the current political cli-
mate of identity politics and the recent revitalisation of
nationalism. A combination of increasing politicisation
and information disorder on the Internet calls for schol-
ars to re-evaluate the ostensibly linear relationship be-
tween the public sphere and identity.
4. The Europeanisation of Public Spheres and the Thin
Prospect of a European Identity
4.1. The Re-Structuring of Political Conflict and Identity
In our view, the relationship between the public sphere
and European identity has been overstated. Implicit
to the ‘Euro-optimistic’ standpoint (e.g., Bruter, Risse)
is the assumption that transnational political conflict
would replicate the left–right contestation seen within
national democracies. However, these assumptions do
not sit comfortably with the ‘transnational/integration-
demarcation’ cleavage theses (Hooghe & Marks, 2017;
Kriesi & Grande, 2006, 2008). To put it crudely, the
latter assumes that cultural-identitarian conflicts would
prevail over economic-utilitarian ones. Recent empiri-
cal evidence lends support to these assumptions. Kriesi
and Grande (2012) found that identity has become the
most effective political mobiliser of this ‘integration–
demarcation’ cleavage. A corollary to the preceding
point is to consider what is being contested. Bartolini
and Hix (2006) distinguish between two types of con-
testation: ‘isomorphic’ and ‘constitutive.’ The former re-
lates to European issues that closely mirror national is-
sues (e.g., tax reform, welfare policy). Contestation of
this kind is typically structured along the left–right di-
mension which is considered normatively desirable be-
cause of its potential to foster transnational left–right
coalitions of ‘collective action’ beyond the nation state
(Habermas, 2012). In contrast, constitutive contestation
poses questions that strike at the heart of the polity (e.g.,
questions relating to membership, treaty change, geo-
graphical boundaries of the Union etc.). In short, isomor-
phic contestation challenges policy and constitutive con-
testation challenges polity. It is difficult to imagine the
emergence of a ‘thick’ European identity in the context
of constitutive contestation. The latter is more suscep-
tible to polarising binary categorisations (e.g., ‘In/Out’
or ‘Remain/Leave’) as they tend to provoke questions
of group membership (i.e., EU membership of Turkey).
In contrast, contestation on isomorphic grounds invokes
a range of opinions which cannot be easily placed into
two opposing camps: Indeed, our assertion appears vin-
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dicated as the left–right dichotomy is beginning to lose
some of its explanatory power in predicting electoral
trends. It does not follow that isomorphic contestation
is not susceptible to polarisation, but we suspect con-
stitutive contestation is more ideologically charged as it
tends to elicit questions that touch on the highly emo-
tive question of ‘who we are?’ (i.e., group membership).
And, as Marks and Hooghe (2003) implicitly argue, the
prevalence of constitutive contestation is indicative of
deficient levels of support for a polity. By the same token,
ideological contestation along the left–right dimension
only tends to dominate when the boundaries of a polity
are accepted (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). Interestingly, pre-
vious studies indicate that Eurosceptic parties tend to fo-
cus predominantly on the constitutive issues of member-
ship (Christensen, 1996; Taggart, 1998). This is unsurpris-
ing given that the jurisdictional boundaries of the EU are
still uncertain. Nonetheless, scholars are right to point
out that contestation per se is not necessarily equiva-
lent to being anti-EU (think of ‘Euro-criticism’) and con-
testation can be, democratically speaking, normatively
desirable (Follesdal, 2014). We expect, however, the pre-
dominance of constitutive contestation to adversely af-
fect EU support, and ergo a civic sense of belonging to
the EU.
4.2. Identities: Inclusive, Exclusive, or Both?
A common denominator of the Euro-optimistic view is
conceiving of multiple and inclusive identities. Whether
scholars understand multiple identities as ‘hierarchical’
(i.e., a ‘Russian doll,’ e.g., national first, Europe second)
or ‘intertwined’ (i.e., a ‘marble-cake,’ e.g., the enmesh-
ment of national and European identity), most scholars
agree that identities are inclusive (Bruter, 2005; Citrin
& Sides, 2004; Marks, 1999; Medrano, 2003; Medrano
& Gutiérrez, 2001; Risse, 2010). Several studies suggest
that high levels of national identity are also consistent
with strong EU support (cf. Citrin & Sides, 2004; Marks
& Hooghe, 2003). Eurobarometer surveys have shown
that a dual sense of attachment to both the nation and
Europe has increased, albeit modestly. This has led to
the assumption that the increasing salience of one iden-
tity (national or European) in the public sphere would
not adversely affect other levels of attachment. However,
identities are (re-)produced in many ways and there is
no logical reason why this cannot apply to identities of
an exclusive kind. In fact, several studies have shown
that the Internet is a seedbed for the production of ex-
clusive virtual communities. The kind of identity that
is constructed in the public sphere has implications for
European integration. A study by Marks and Hooghe
(2003) has shown that people who hold an exclusive
national identity are less likely to support and identify
with the EU (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 2001; Deflen &
Pampel, 1996; Klingeren & Boomgaarden, 2014). The
effect is even stronger in countries where EU integra-
tion has become politicised (Marks & Hooghe, 2003).
Furthermore, identities are more likely to be conflict-
ual if national identity is framed in cultural instead of
civic terms (Smith, 1992). And socioeconomic factors
(e.g., economic decline, migration, etc.) are likely to am-
plify the effects of exclusive-identity framing, making na-
tional identity come into conflict with European iden-
tity (Cinpoes, 2008). In sum, a combination of exclusive-
cultural-identity framing, politicised European debates,
and a deteriorating socioeconomic situation, are likely
to disrupt the EU integration process. Where does the
Internet fit into the triadic relationship between public
spheres, politicisation, and identity?
The Internet is likely to foster politicisation for two
reasons. Firstly, politicisation, by definition, opens up
conflict to new actors (de Wilde & Leupold, 2015) who
have easy access to new mediums of communication in
which to participate in debates. Secondly, the Internet is
expected to increase polarisation. The Internet is largely
unmediated thereby creating a fertile environment for
the permeation of divisive discourses. This has enfran-
chised new voices, many of whom are no friends of
European integration. Social media has been found by
one study to strengthen the Eurosceptics hand. There is
no a priori reason why they should benefit but they have
done (TNS Global, as cited in Cerulus, 2015). Moreover,
a plethora of studies have shown that the Internet
reinforces—or at least, reflects—ethno-cultural identi-
ties and can rouse nationalism (Barisione & Michailidou,
2017; Derman & Ross, 2003; Koopmans & Zimmermann,
2003; T. H. Eriksen, 2007). According to several stud-
ies, national identity (Miller & Slater, 2001) and nation-
alism (Caiani & Parenti, 2009; Gidişoğlu & Rızvanoğlu,
2011; T. H. Eriksen, 2007) are thriving on social me-
dia (Barisione & Michailidou, 2017). As Diamandaki puts
it, “the Internet—a placeless medium—allows for the
(re)creation of place…[cyberspace is] another archive,
mirror, and laboratory for the negotiation of national and
ethnic identity” (Diamandaki, 2003, pp. 3–4). Without
explicitly addressing the public sphere and identity de-
bate, these studies contradict the notion of the Internet
as a ‘global village.’ Notwithstanding this, we acknowl-
edge that it is probably too hasty to jump to the con-
clusion that the Internet serves to embolden national al-
legiances of an exclusive kind (Gidişoğlu & Rızvanoğlu,
2011; T. H. Eriksen, 2007). There are several caveats:
Firstly, participation in cyberspace still represents a frac-
tion of civil society, and questions can be raised about
the generalisability of these findings beyond the cases
studied; secondly, we cannot demonstratively claim that
a collective identity would emerge or whether they
merely reflect pre-existing identities emanating from a
negligible minority; lastly, assuming that online com-
munities foster offline identities, we cannot confidently
assert that these identities would be of an exclusive
kind as offline interactions might override these senti-
ments. Only time will tell if the increasing use of the
Internet will foster post-national identities or dismantle
the ‘global village.’
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4.3. Europeanised National Public Spheres: The Current
State of Play
Most scholars have settled on the notion of the
‘Europeanisation of national public spheres.’ In other
words, Europeanisation takes national public spheres
as starting points for the emergence of European iden-
tity. Most scholars accept that some modest form of
Europeanisation is taking place within national publics
spheres, particularly, in terms of increasing EU cover-
age and converging frames of reference. However, it
would be a speculative to assume that a European iden-
tity would emerge on this basis. The media are heavily
embedded in national institutional structures. As a re-
sult, EU news is reported with a heavy national accent.
Indeed, several studies support this claim, most notably,
Medrano’s study (2003) which shows the dominance
of national frames (see also Bijsmans & Altides, 2007).
This has led some scholars to describe the Europeanised
public sphere as nationally ‘segmented’ (Wessler et al.,
2008). The Internet does not seem to alter this dy-
namic. Even in cyberspace, studies have shown that
these spaces are nationally embedded (Barisione &
Michailidou, 2017; Koopmans & Zimmermann, 2003).
In short, both online and offline spaces tend to tell
European stories through a national filter.
The logic of mass-media reporting means that there
is little prospect of national frames disappearing in the
foreseeable future. The media are institutionally and cul-
turally structured along national lines; therefore, they
are hardwired to evoke national identity and frame sto-
ries in ways that appeal to national audiences. With ref-
erence to news value research, we can begin to under-
stand why national frames persist. The media scholar
(Schulz, 1982, as cited in de Wilde, 2019, p. 1196) pro-
posed four criteria which determine ‘newsworthiness’:
valence (i.e., controversy, aggression, success, values);
identification (i.e., ethnocentrism, emotions, personali-
sation); relevance (i.e., concern, consequence, proxim-
ity); and status (i.e., elites, leaders). As national me-
dia outlets mainly cater to national audiences, the for-
mer are likely to evoke national identity as it is the
most salient identity to the reader/listener. Indeed, one
study has shown that the ‘we’ tends to be the nation
(Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2010). Mass media are more
likely to report on national executives (status) and do-
mestic actor/issues (relevance) that the reader can re-
late to. Eurosceptic actors are also expected to receive
a disproportionate level of attention because they tend
to fuel controversy (valence). De Wilde (2019) rightly ar-
gues that these criteria should also apply to politicians
given that their political claims propensity to resonate
with wider audiences largely hinges on the mass media.
Identity-politics can thus be understood as a logical and
successful media strategy as political claims that lack an
identitarian component contain less news value. This has
led deWilde (2019) to hypothesise that increasingmedia
coverage of EU affairs could actually strengthen national
identities. He convincingly argues that media logic func-
tions to empower what he calls ‘discursive intergovern-
mentalism,’ that is, themedia portraying the EU as a zero-
sum game between nations rather than a project of com-
mon endeavour. In short, the mass media are likely to
be an impediment to a consolidated Europeanised pub-
lic sphere and ergo European identity (de Wilde, 2019).
Public spheres are highly fragmented, and this ap-
plies to the local, national, and European level. This im-
plies that public opinion and will formation are also frag-
mented. The EU consists of 27 nation-states containing
their own nationally structured and culturally embedded
news outlets speaking different vernaculars. ‘Europe’ is
constructed differently within and across countries and
varies according to the type of medium and media out-
let. It is not unreasonable to claim that Europeanised
public spheres are probably even more fragmented than
national ones as there are over 27 different national
‘narrative networks’ (Eder, 2009) to reconcile. And, re-
cent evidence suggests that there is little prospect of na-
tional cleavages coalescing into transnational coalitions
of collective action. In contrast, national public spheres
possess the legitimising glue of national identity and
pre-existing cultural, political, and media institutions to
bind these fragmented narratives together. Moreover,
previous research has shown that negative valence of
the EU and national indexicality are more prevalent
in ‘tabloid’ vis-à-vis ‘quality’ newspapers (Kleinen-von
Königslöw, 2010). In contrast, quality newspapers are
more likely to adopt European frames of reference and
support European integration (Trenz, 2008a). These dif-
ferences have contributed to the social stratification of
support for European integration as poorer and unedu-
cated people are the tabloids main market. The impor-
tance of social class as a predictor for EU support is well-
known in the scholarship on public opinion. This frag-
mentation has culminated in a discernible mismatch be-
tween elite perceptions of Europe and the general public
(Medrano, 2009).
5. Information Disorder: A Disruptive Factor of the
Public Sphere?
Epistemological inquiries into the nature of knowledge
and truth, and human comprehension thereof, are as
old as time. Yet it seems recent political events such as
Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have brought
the importance of truth in public discourse to the fore-
front. Since then, the study of ‘information disorder’ has
become a burgeoning field of study. Information disor-
der is the trinity of ‘disinformation’ (i.e., the deliberate
intent to spread false information), ‘misinformation’ (i.e.,
the accidental spreading of false information) and ‘ma-
linformation’ (i.e., true information spread with the in-
tent to cause harm; Corcoran et al., 2019). The observa-
tions we made earlier—namely, the rise of identity pol-
itics, increasingly politicised European debates, and the
non-actualisation of a strong European identity—can be
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partially attributed to disruptive information. Claiming
that the process of communication is imperfect is not
a novel assertion, but some of the recent scholarship
on how ‘information disorder’ can disrupt discourse and
democracy, may help to explain why a strong European
identity has proved elusive. These studies highlight that
the manner in which people acquire, process and store
new information, does not appear to be congruent with
the congealment of a European identity.
Much of the scholarship on information disorder re-
volves around social media. Though there are many po-
tential components of a digitalised public sphere (news
websites, blogs, vlogs, instantmessaging apps), the three
major contemporary social media networks (Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram) weigh heavily on both polemics
and research of contemporarymedia influence. This may
prove to be an overestimation, but in an assessment
of a potential Europeanised public sphere, the impact
of social media should not be overlooked. Social me-
dia have the potential to foster transnational commu-
nication; their influence and embeddedness with tradi-
tional media, and their widespread adoption as an in-
strument of political communication (Klašnja, Barberá,
Beauchamp, Nagler, & Tucker, 2018) make them crucial
to the emergence of transnational identity. Of course,
the popularity of utilising social media for ‘information
campaigns’ (which target the EU) is a decisive factor
as well (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019); the latter can be
regarded as one of the main compounding factors for
the Europeanised public spheres’ woes. This is where
the dichotomy of the ‘EU’ and ‘Europe’ becomes im-
portant. Travelling and having friends abroad can signif-
icantly shape one’s attachment to ‘Europe,’ but it is the
‘EU’ that has been, and still is, amajor point of contention
in the process Europeanisation.
False narratives have been part of the discourse on
the EU for decades, but social media in particular have
the potential to be influential in this regard. It remains
an open question whether media actually have any influ-
ence, in general, and social media, in particular. This arti-
cle has already ascribed a modest role to traditional me-
dia in fostering Europeanisation. In a similar vein, recent
studies on the effects of disinformation in the European
elections and the 2016 US Presidential elections are cau-
tious in overstating the influence of disinformation on
social media (Alcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Fletcher, Cornia,
Graves, & Kleis Nielsen, 2018). This, thus, begs the ques-
tion: Why would social media and information disorder
be deemed potentially pernicious to the congealment
of a Europeanised public sphere? Because information
disorder has the potential to unravel the social fabric
and weaken the social capital of the public sphere itself
by casting doubt on the existence of truth and account-
ability. Though the peddling of false narratives in tradi-
tional media cannot be excluded, editorial responsibil-
ity and journalistic standards, at least, ensure minimum
levels of accountability which are not present in social
media. As Klinger and Svensson (2014) have argued, so-
cial media follows a different logic than traditional me-
dia. Direct links between content creators and their au-
diences are made possible, and even encouraged, since
popularity increases the visibility and resonance of con-
tent. Social media logic gives precedence to virality over
factuality, which can prove disruptive when the topic
of discussion is something as complex as the EU. There
is the danger of emotive language and simplified narra-
tives predominating.
Social media utilise cognitive principles with quick
and short messages that often containmore emotionally
charged content than traditional (news) media. Social
media’s reach may still not be as big as the latter, but
their influence is growing. The EU is aware of infor-
mation disorder’s pernicious effects on the media land-
scape, as demonstrated by the many fact-checking initia-
tives it supports, such as EUvsDisinfo. In spite of these
efforts, countering information disorder with facts has
not proven sufficient to negate false narratives (de Cock
Buning et al., 2018). However, studies have shown that
informing people of the existence of manipulative and
false information makes them better equipped to iden-
tify false narratives (Roozenbeek, van der Linden, &
Nygren, 2020), suggesting that it is not all doom and
gloom for contemporary public spheres. Research has
shown that negative information travels faster and fur-
ther, which is more commensurate to the strategies and
frames used by Eurosceptic politicians and the media
(Balahur, Flore, Podavini, & Verile, 2019). Moreover, the
complexity of European politics and the potential eco-
nomic benefits deriving from membership do not nec-
essarily translate into appealing and acceptable media
content. Compounding matters is the EU’s constitutional
and organisational complexity which makes it more vul-
nerable tomisunderstanding and thus tomisinformation.
Combined with the human propensity to retain the first
information that one consumes on a given topic and
heuristics that favour modifying new information to fit
pre-existing beliefs (Southwell et al., 2017), one could ar-
gue that there is a home advantage for national identity
over the more abstract and nascent European identity.
With the above in mind, information disorder should be
considered as an inherent part of the Europeanised pub-
lic sphere since both the spread and processing of infor-
mation cannot preclude the dissemination of falsehoods.
6. Conclusion
It was expected that the increasing coverage of EU af-
fairs in national public spheres would eventually lead
to a greater sense of European belonging. Although
the public sphere and mass media were pivotal to
the development and sustenance of a nationally imag-
ined community, there are compelling reasons to doubt
whether a similar dynamic would hold in a transna-
tional setting. Identity is a multifaceted and multifacto-
rial phenomenon; it is understood both as a product
of national public discourses, but also as a determinant
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of Europeanised public spheres. However, as Checkel
(2014) aptly reminds us, the public sphere is only one
locus where identity can be constructed. Transnational
exchanges at the micro level also help to foster iden-
tification with Europe. In short, we endorse Checkel’s
(2014) view for advocating a more comprehensive ap-
proach to identity as created through social communi-
cation (providing that the right scope conditions are in
place) and social contact (as in Deutsch, 1966). With this
in mind, we argue that establishing linear relationships
predicated on the public sphere alone is a perilous route
to take. The current deliberative setting of the public
sphere is not commensurate to a collective EU identity.
Politicisation has expanded the scope of conflict to other
actors such as Eurosceptics. The Internet has enfran-
chised new actors from outside Europe to infiltrate the
Europeanised public sphere more easily. Furthermore,
cyberspace has demonstrated to be a hotbed for fu-
elling Euroscepticism and polarising discourse. And, as
previous scholars have theorised and demonstrated em-
pirically, these divisions are predominantly structured
along the cultural-identitarian dimension. With the rise
of identity politics, political parties are evoking stronger
and more salient national identities to mobilise support.
Moreover, we argue that the preponderance of consti-
tutive contestation is likely to hamper support for the
EU and feelings of attachment towards Europe. Although
we acknowledge that people can hold multiple inclusive
identities, it does not follow that all identities are of this
kind. It is not national identity per se but exclusive kinds
which have negative implications for European levels of
attachment. Lastly, Europeanised public spheres are na-
tionally segmented and highly fragmented. Social media
and the rising tide of information disorder have exacer-
bated this dynamic through their exploitation of human
cognitive functions and prioritising virality over factuality.
Due to the embeddedness of online and offline media
within national structures, and a nationally entrenched
media logic, there are meagre prospects of this changing
in the near future. A healthy public sphere should there-
fore account for more than factual discourse alone in or-
der to foster a European identity.
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